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COMMENTS
CULVER V. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:
RESTRICTION OF SERVICEMEN'S INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOMS ABROAD FOR FOREIGN
POLICY REASONS
The controversies surrounding the Vietnam war spawned extensive
litigation in military law., Many of the consequent courts-martial and
civil suits revealed an underlying antagonism between first amend-
meit freedoms of speech and assembly and the military's need to con-
tr 1 the behavior of its servicemen.2 The military's justifiable concern
with values such as discipline, motivation, and obedience resulted in
the promulgation of regulations, frequently couched in broad and im-
precise terms, that restricted speech and conduct detrimental to the
interests of the armed forces.3 The "general articles," 4 prominent
1. See Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Culver v. Secretary of the
Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp.
626 (D.D.C. 1978); Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972); Cortright
v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied sub nom. Cortright v. Froehlke, 405 U.S. 965 (1972) ; Miller v. Rockefeller,
327 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3. See, e.g., Air Force Reg. 35-15, § 3e(3) (b), which is quoted at note 9 infra.
4. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), arts. 133-134, 10 U.S.C. §§
933-934 (1970). Article 133 provides in pertinent part: "Any commissioned
officer . . . who is convicted of conduct unbeconiing an officer and a gentleman
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." Article 134 provides in pertinent
part:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital ... shall be taken
cognizance of by a . . . court-martial . . . and shall be punished
at the discretion of that court.
The UCMJ is a codification of the military's rules of criminal justice. The
punitive articles define criminal offenses under military law. UCMJ, arts. 77-134,
10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1970). Particular crimes are defined in Articles 77-132.
Id. §§ 877-932. Some offenses, such as disobedience of orders and desertion, are
uniquely military in nature. See, e.g., UCMJ, arts. 85, 92, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 892
(1970). Other violations, including murder and rape, are common to criminal
codes generally.
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among such laws, were upheld against challenges for vagueness and
overbreadth in Parker v. Levy.5 Suggesting that these statutes may be
unconstitutional if applied in a civilian context,6 the United States
Supreme Court held in Parker that the broad language of the articles
is justified by the fundamental differences between military and
civilian society.7
Similarly, in Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force," the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit con-
sidered vagueness and overbreadth challenges to Air Force Regulation
35-15, 3e(3) (b), 9 which prohibits Air Force personnel stationed
abroad from participating in demonstrations. Affirming the district
court's summary judgment for the government,' the appellate court
sustained the court-martial conviction of Culver, a captain in the
Judge Advocate General's Corps of the United States Air Force."
In determining that the Air Force regulation is neither vague nor
overbroad, the majority applied the standards of review identified
by the Supreme Court in Parker.12 Unlike the rationale in Parker,
however, which premised the validity of the general articles on the
need for discipline and obedience within the military, the decision in
Culver justified the regulation's legality on the sensitive position of
the military in foreign affairs.'
3
5. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
6. See id. at 758-59, in which the Court quotes United States v. Priest, 21
C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1970):
In the armed forces some restrictions exist for reasons that have
no counterpart in the civilian community. Disrespectful and con-
temptous speech, even advocacy of violent change, is tolerable in the
civilian community, for it does not directly affect the capacity of the
Government to discharge its responsibilities unless it both is directed
to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such
action. In military life, however, other considerations must be
weighed. The armed forces depend on a command structure that
at times must commit men to combat, not only hazarding their lives
but ultimately involving the security of the Nation itself. Speech
that is protected in the civil population may nonetheless undermine
the effectiveness of response to command. If it does, it is constitu-
tionally unprotected.
(Citations omitted).
7. 417 U.S. at 756-57.
8. 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
9. This regulation provides: "Members of the Air Force are prohibited from
participating in demonstrations when . . . [i]n a foreign country."
10. Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 389 F. Supp. 331 (D.D.C. 1975).
11. 559 F.2d at 630.
12. See id. at 624.
13. Id. at 628.
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Clearly, the need for discipline and obedience is an internal aspect
of the military, crucial to its effective operation. Matters of foreign
policy, on the other hand, are external to the structure of the armed
forces; the statuses of foreign policy issues change rapidly and exert
no constant pressure upon the military comparable to the continuing
requirement of the maintenance of internal order. The holding in
Culver sanctioning restrictions on the first amendment freedoms of
military personnel for foreign policy reasons, therefore, constitutes
a significant extension of the military's power to control its personnel
and may portend the creation of greater restrictions on the rights of
servicemen abroad.
Culver manifests the recent liberal approach to collateral attacks of
courts-martial in civil courts.14 Modern legal developments support
both the District of Columbia Circuit's subject matter and equitable
jurisdiction to review Culver's court-martial. 15 Whether the court
exercised the proper scope of review, however, is less clear. This Com-
ment will discuss briefly the court's jurisdiction to hear Culver's
claim and trace the inconclusive history of the proper scope of civilian
court review of military courts-martial. Finally, the Comment will
analyze the propriety of the court's decision on the merits with respect
to its disposition of Culver's vagueness and overbreadth claims.
COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON COURTS-MARTIAL
The plaintiff in Culver collaterally attacked his court-martial con-
viction, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensa-
tion for monetary damages. Review of court-martial convictions his-
torically has been limited to habeas corpus actions 16 and to certain
suits in the Court of Claims.17 In a series of recent cases, however,
several federal courts of appeals have held that civil courts possess
subject matter jurisdiction to review courts-martial in other than
habeas corpus proceedings.' 8 The Supreme Court's acceptance of this
14. Prior to the late 1950's federal district courts would entertain collateral
attacks on courts-martial only in habeas corpus proceedings. See notes 16-18
infra & accompanying text. For a history of cases involving non-habeas corpus
actions, see Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1040, 1219 n.70 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus]. See gen-
erally Peck, supra note 1.
15. See notes 18-21, 23-24 infra & accompanying text.
16. See Peck, supra note 1, at 7-9; Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 14, at
1208-38.
17. Traditionally the Court of Claims has heard attacks on courts-martial in
suits to recover back pay. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907).
18. See, e.g., Homcy v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (declaratory
judgment voiding conviction and mandatory injunction); Kauffman v. Secretary
1977]
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view in Schlesinger v. Councilman 19 eliminated some of the tradi-
tional jurisdictional restrictions on judicial review of courts-martial 20
and supports the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in Culver.21
Despite a finding of subject-matter jurisdiction in Councilman, the
Supreme Court emphasized that judicial propriety and rules of equi-
table jurisdiction normally preclude interference by civil courts with
the ongoing proceedings of the military court system.22 Invoking the
"exhaustion of remedies" doctrine, 23 the Court indicated that a civil
court might properly entertain a collateral attack of a court-martial
only upon the completion of review within the military's judicial hier-
archy.24 In Culver the challenged court-martial was subject to no
further military review when the collateral attack was instituted ;25
the court, therefore, possessed equitable as well as subject matter
jurisdiction.
Scope of Review
The most perplexing problem concerning modern collateral attacks
on courts-martial is that of defining the civil court's scope of re-
view.26 Over a century ago, in Dynes v. Hoover,27 the Supreme Court
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (declaratory judgment); Smith
v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968) (mandamus); Gallagher v. Quinn,
363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966) (mandatory injunc-
tion); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965) (declaratory judgment).
19. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
20. See id. at 745, 750-51, 753.
21. In Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 520 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which
a court-martial conviction was challenged collaterally, the court interpreted
Councilman as expanding the traditional jurisdictional limitations. Noting the
jurisdictional finding in Councilman, the court stated: "We view Councilman as
the more difficult jurisdictional case [because it was an attempt to enjoin a trial]
and are confident that there is jurisdiction to consider an action seeking post-
conviction relief." Id. at 102-03 n.5.
22. 420 U.S. at 755-57. According to the majority, "when a serviceman charged
with crimes by military authorities can show no harm other than that attendant
to resolution of his case in the military court system, the federal district courts
must refrain from intervention, by way of injunction or otherwise." Id. at 758.
23. Id. The Court analogized the ban against judicial intervention in ongoing
court-martial proceedings to the requirement that federal courts refrain from
interfering in state criminal and federal agency proceedings. Id. at 755-58.
24. Id. at 758.
25. Brief for Appellee at 16-17, Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d
622 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. For a detailed discussion of the availability, method, and scope of review,
see Strassburg, Civilian Review of Military Criminal Justice, 66 MIL. L. REv. 1,
1-41 (1974).
27. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
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held that civil review of courts-martial was confined to jurisdictional
determinations. The reviewing court limited its inquiry to ascertain-
ing the propriety of the subject matter jurisdiction exercised by the
court-martial, 2 the legality of the sentence imposed by the military
adjudication, 29 and the conformity of the court-martial proceeding
with statutory mandates.30 Subsequently, the Supreme Court's expan-
sion of judicial review to due process challenges in civilian habeas
corpus proceedings 31 prompted lower federal courts to entertain ques-
tions of due process in military habeas corpus proceedings as well.32
However, the decision in Hiatt v. Brown,33 in which the Supreme
Court reiterated that only jurisdictional questions are within the
province of civilian judicial review,34 halted this liberal approach.
Burns v. Wilson,3 5 the most recent Supreme Court case to address
the scope of judicial review issue in the context of courts-martial, an-
nounced the present standard. In Burns the Court stated that a civilian
court could review alleged violations of the Constitution, but only if
the military tribunal had failed to consider those questions "fully and
fairly." 36 Deliberation of the constitutional issues by the court-
28. Id. at 81.
29. Id. at 83.
30. Id. at 81.
31. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
32. See, e.g., Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943).
33. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
34. Id. at 111. In Hiatt, the petitioner claimed that he had been denied due
process and challenged specifically the sufficiency of the evidence, the adequacy of
the pretrial investigation, and the competency of defense counsel. The Court
refused to decide the issues on the merits, stating that such a determination
would exceed its powers of review. Id. at 110-11.
Nine months after Hiatt, the Court seemed to liberalize the permissible scope
of review in Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950). In holding that the
defendant serviceman had been accorded due process while specifically restating
the principle that jurisdiction is "the only issue before the Court in habeas
corpus proceedings," id. at 126, the Court suggested that a denial of due process
could be jurisdictional in nature if the defendant is denied the opportunity to
raise an issue, such as insanity. Id. at 124.
For a discussion of the propriety of broadened collateral review by civil courts,
see Strassburg, supra note 26, at 48-63. See generally Peck, supra note 1; Sher-
man, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies
Requirement, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 483 (1969).
35. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
36. Id. at 142. Citing Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950), the Court
stated that "when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allega-
tion raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the
writ [of habeas corpus] simply to re-evaluate the evidence." 346 U.S. at 142.
19771
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martial, however, precluded a civilian court from "reexamin [ing]
and reweigh [ing] each item of evidence." 37
The Burns standard, permitting judicial review of claimed constitu-
tional violations in appropriate situations, is broader than the rule
stated in Hiatt, which limited review to jurisdictional issues only.
Predictably, attempts to reconcile the two doctrines have produced in-
consistent interpretations. 38 A majority of jurisdictions refuse to in-
quire into alleged constitutional violations, following a determination
that the military fairly considered the petitioner's contentions.39 This
approach contrasts with an interpretation adopted by one minority,
which permits civil courts to conduct detailed reviews of constitutional
issues.40
The latter approach received the Supreme Court's limited approval
in Parker v. Levy,41 in which the Court conducted an extensive re-
view of the constitutionality of the general articles in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).42 Nevertheless, some vitality for
the majority construction of Burns remained: the Court in Parker
authoritatively cited Burns to delimit the review of other issues to be
considered on remand. 43
Burns, Hiatt, and the decisions preceding those cases suggest that
the Supreme Court has limited its scope of review primarily because
neither the Constitution nor the Congress has given the Court direct
appellate or supervisory power over military courts.44 Yet the Court
regards itself as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, 45 and col-
lateral attacks offer the justices their sole opportunity to review con-
stitutional questions arising in courts-martial. Parker manifests this
latter proposition, suggesting that civil courts may review comprehen-
sively the constitutionality of the articles and regulations governing
37. 346 U.S. at 144.
38. See Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 193, 206-09 (1966).
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 209. In the other two minority patterns the courts have attempted
either to avoid the scope of review issue by declaring that the petitioner's allega-
tions are insufficient regardless of the degree of scrutiny employed or to satisfy
simultaneously the standards enunciated in both Burns and Hiatt. Id. at 206-07.
41. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
42. See id. at 752-61. See notes 4-7 supra & accompanying text.
43. See id. at 762.
44. See 346 U.S. at 140; 339 U.S. at 111. See generally In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1946) (no congressional grant); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 243, 251 (1863) (no constitutional grant).
45. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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the rights and conduct of military personnel. 46 The judicial activism
in military justice sanctioned by Parker, however, was tempered by
the Court's citation of Burns. Thus, unless the military tribunal failed
to consider the issue fairly, the civil courts remain precluded from in-
quiring whether the constitutional or other legal rights of a service-
man were denied by a specific action of a military official that is
alleged to be unauthorized under those articles and regulations. 47
Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force followed the principles sug-
gested in Parker. In Culver the court reviewed the substantive first
amendment challenges to the Air Force regulation; however, the ma-
jority questioned the court's authority to consider the propriety of an
allegedly prejudicial jury instruction. 48 Such a limited scrutiny was
consistent with Parker.
Whether this liberal approach to defining the permissible scope of
review will be extended to enable' the civil courts to consider all con-
stitutional questions in a collateralattack is uncertain. A belief among
some federal judges that the military's judicial system does not always
consider constitutional claims adequately 49 suggests that at least some
members of the judiciary would welcome such an extension. However,
the current conservative direction ,of the Supreme Court in military
matters,50 together with the specific constitutional power of Congress
46. Compare Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding constitutionality
of UCMJ arts. 133 & 134, which prohibit "conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman" and conduct prejudicial to "good order and discipline in the armed
forces") with Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (upholding constitution-
ality of UCMJ arts. 16, 20, and 27 providing for summary courts-martial without
benefit of defense counsel) and Culver v./Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d
622 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding constitutionality of Air Force regulation that
proscribes servicemen's participation in "demonstrations" in foreign countries).
47. But see Peck, supra note 1, at 65, in which the author concludes that "the
Court has finally removed any doubt that it will entertain the full range of con-
stitutional challenges to military administrative activities," and that "there is no
longer any restriction on the nature of the constitutional challenges which are
eligible for review." Id.
48. 559 F.2d at 629.
49. See, e.g., Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622, 630-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ; Id. at 637 n.12 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
In Culver the constitutional issues did receive extensive consideration at the trial
level and at two levels of military review. Brief for Appellee at 16-17, Culver v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a forceful state-
ment outlining the constitutional guaranties afforded a defendant in military
criminal proceedings see Strassburg, supra note 26, at 50-54.
50. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (defense lawyer not
required in summary court-martial); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(military commander's prohibition against political campaigning on military
base upheld); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (civil court's
1977]
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to regulate the armed forces,51 may prevent further expansion of the
civil courts' authority to conduct reviews of constitutional issues.
MILITARY NECESSITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The judiciary's increasing willingness to review a variety of mili-
tary matters derived in part from the extensive litigation initiated
during the Vietnam war. Some of the war's foremost opponents were
members of the Armed Forces who became parties to suits challenging
traditional assumptions of military authority. 52
Captain Thomas Culver was a member of the United States Air
Force and stationed in England when he was charged with organizing
and participating in a demonstration in violation of a lawful order.53
Following his trial and conviction by general court-martial, he at-
tacked the judgment collaterally in federal court.54 In considering
Culver's claim that the regulation banning participation in demonstra-
tions in foreign countries was vague and overbroad, the court applied
the test for review of alleged constitutional infirmities in military
law formulated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy.
Parker v. Levy: The Military Standard
As noted, the petitioner in Parker v. Levy challenged the general
articles of the UCMJ. 55 Because the Supreme Court previously had
upheld the general articles, 56 the military relied on them extensively
during the Vietnam war to permit the court-martial of dissidents for
interference with court-martial proceedings proscribed); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974) (UCMJ general articles upheld against vagueness and over-
breadth challenges).
51. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
52. For a discussion of cases arising under the first amendment during the
Vietnam war, see Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amend-
ment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 325 (1971).
53. Culver was charged under Article 133 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 933
(1970), .for soliciting military personnel to violate Air Force Reg. 35-15, §
3e(3) (b). For the pertinent text of the article and regulation see notes 4 & 9
supra. Culver's personal participation in the demonstration resulted in his being
charged under Article 92 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970), which provides
in pertinent part: "Any person subject to this chapter who . . . violates or fails
to obey any lawful general order or regulation . . . shall be punished as a court-
martial shall direct."
54. 559 F.2d at 623.
55. See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Swaim v. United
States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882); cf. Dynes v.
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conduct that arguably was protected by the first amendment. 57
Parker, however, provided the Supreme Court with its first oppor-
tunity to rule on the articles' conformity with modern standards of
vagueness and overbreadth. 58 Holding that the special nature and
mission of the armed forces dictated constitutional standards for mili-
tary statutes different from those applicable in civilian society, the
Court found the general articles to be neither vague nor overbroad. 9
Vagueness
Noting that the broad reach of the general articles had been nar-
rowed by judicial and executive construction, the Supreme Court in
Parker held that inherent differences between military and civilian
society required the vagueness challenge to be reviewed under the
criteria applicable to "criminal statutes regulating economic af-
fairs." 6 As such, the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute
properly enacted by Congress could not be overcome by a mere show-
ing of difficulty in determining whether marginal acts fell within the
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) (naval equivalent of the general articles
upheld). See also Weiner, Are the General Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?,
54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
57. The Court of Military Appeals decided four principal cases involving first
amendment rights during this era: United States v. Gray, 20 C.M.A. 63, 42
C.M.R. 255 (1970); United States v. Harvey, 19 C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141
(1970); United States v. Daniels, 19 C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); United
States v. Howe, 17 C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967). See also United States v.
Vorhees, 4 C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 .(1954) (servicemen's first amendment right
to publish a book that criticized American involvement in Korea held limited by
strict military necessity). See generally Sherman, supra note 52; Wulf, Com-
mentary: A Soldier's First Amendment Rights.% The Art of Formally Granting
and Practically Suppressing, 18 WAYNE L. RLv. 665 (1972).
58. Captain Levy was charged with violations of the UCMJ, arts. 90, 133-134,
10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 933-934, for refusing to train Special Forces personnel and for
making public statements in opposition to the Vietnam war to enlisted men. 417
U.S. at 737-39. His numerous appeals in military and civilian courts, see id. at
740 n.7, resulted in a successful habeas corpus petition to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd,*417
U.S. 733 (1974), which held the general articles to be void for vagueness.
59. 417 U.S. at 756-57. Several weeks after its decision in Parker, the Court
decided a companion case, Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
In a per curiam opinion the Court dismissed Avrech's vagueness and overbreadth
challenges to Arti~le 134 on the basis of Parker. For an analysis of Parker and
Avrech, see Everett, Perspective: Military Justice in the Wake of Parker v.
Levy, 67 MIr. L. RaV. 1 (1975).
60. 417 U.S. at 756.
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law's proscription."' The term "void for vagueness," according to the
Court, "'simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach
where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated con-
duct is proscribed.' " 62 Because the general articles prohibited an
ascertainable range of conduct 6 3 and the defendant had received
reasonable notice of the illegality of the activity,6 4 the Court concluded
that the vagueness challenge was without merit.
Overbreadth
The concept of "expanded standing" in first amendment cases per-
mits those persons whose constitutional rights are not violated directly
to challenge statutes for overbreadth. 65 Although the Court in Parker
conceded that a serviceman might be accorded expanded standing even
though his conduct clearly lies within the prohibitions of the statute,
it recognized that the exigencies of military society normally would
preclude an expansion of strict standing doctrine.66
The imposition of limited standing required a rejection of the over-
breadth challenge as applied to the appellee's conduct in Parker.
Nevertheless, the Court also indicated that the challenged regulations
61. Id. at 757, quoting United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S.
29, 32-33 (1963). See also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (upholding
the Immigration Act); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding
the Communications Act of 1934).
62. 417 U.S. at 757, quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
63. 417 U.S. at 754-57.
64. The Court in Parker found that Captain Levy "could have had no reason-
able doubt that his public statements urging Negro enlisted men not to go to
Vietnam if ordered to do so were both 'unbecoming to an officer and a gentleman,'
and 'to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces ... "
417 U.S. at 757.
65. An exception to the traditional rules of standing "has been carved out in
the area of the First Amendment," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611
(1973), on the ground that the importance of a free society justifies "attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
the requisite narrow specificity." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). For a general review of the
overbreadth doctrine see Torke, The Future of First Amendment Overbreadth,
27 VAND. L. REv. 289 (1974). See generally Imwinkelried & Zillman, An Evolution
in the First Amendment: Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the
Military Community, 54 TExAs L. REv. 42 (1975).
66. 417 U.S. at 758-60. Although holding that servicemen are accorded first
amendment protection, the Court nevertheless stated that the "differing character
of the military community and of the military mission" required the protected
rights to be implemented under alternative procedures than those that are
applicable to civilian society. Id. at 758. Accordingly, the Court held that the
[Vol. 19-:119
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could not be invalidated as facially overbroad.6 7 The Court thus con-
cluded that the general articles prohibited only a broad range of
"easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable ... conduct," 68
whereas the behavior in question was "unprotected under the most
expansive notions of the First Amendment." 69
Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force
Although both Culver and Parker involved vagueness and over-
breadth challenges to military laws, significant differences exist be-
tween the two cases. These disparities arguably render Parker's
standards inapplicable to Culver.
Vagueness
Asserting that an extended analysis of the vagueness issue was
unnecessary, the court in Culver simply applied Parker's holding
without discussion and determined that the vagueness claim was in-
valid.7 0 Closer examination reveals that the court's application of the
Parker standard is justifiable, albeit not on the basis of Parkers
reasoning.
One pronounced difference between the two cases is the type of law
in question. In Parker, the Court reviewed the challenged UCMT
"'weighty countervailing policies,' which permit the extension of standing in
First Amendment cases involving civilian society, must be accorded a good deal
less weight in the military context." Id. at 760 (citation omitted), quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973).
67. 417 U.S. at 757-58.
68. Id. at 760, quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973) (invalidation of a statute on its
face is inappropriate if there exists a substantial number of situations to which
it can be applied validly).
69. 417 U.S. at 761.
70. 559 F.2d at 624, 630. The court regarded Parker and Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976) as "immediately controlling," and stated:
It seems neither necessary nor desirable in this case to attempt
a comprehensive analysis of the authorities generally treating the
questions of overbreadth or vagueness. There could be a temptation
in such a crowded legal art to become captives of collateral problems
of the past and the apprehensions of the future in diversion from
issues presently before us. The timing and circumstances of this case
lie somewhere between the travail of Vietnam and prior wars and,
hopefully, the more complete release of freedom from the remaining
constraints of military necessity abroad, as well as at home.
559 F.2d at 624.
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articles 71 under the presumptive validity accorded to all congressional
enactments.7 2 In Culver, however, the defendant contested the legality
of an Air Force regulation.73 Whether a court reviewing the constitu-
tionality of a military regulation should grant that regulation the
same deference afforded to congressional enactments is questionable.
To the extent that Parker relied on the presumptive validity of federal
statutes, it fails to support the decision in Culver.
Parker also differs from Culver insofar as the statutes challenged
in the former case had been interpreted by their extensive judicial and
legislative history. The American Articles of War were adopted almost
verbatim in 1775 from the British Articles, and despite substantial
changes in 1951, the general articles of the UCMJ retain intact many
of their earlier provisions.7 4 Further, the judiciary has construed the
general articles narrowly, according due consideration to the "long-
standing customs and usages of the services [that] impart accepted
meaning to the [articles'] seemingly imprecise standards." 75 Finally,
the Manual for Courts-Martial details the scope of the general arti-
cles.7e The proscription of a wide range of unquestionably impermis-
sible behavior,77 therefore, has resulted in relatively few restrictions
on first amendment rights. Such considerations compelled the Court
in Parker to apply a relaxed standard of review for vagueness to the
general articles.78 In contrast, the scope of the Air Force regulation
71. UCMJ, arts. 133-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-934 (1970).
72. 417 U.S. at 757, quoting United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372
U.S. 29, 32 (1963).
73. AFR 35-15, 1 3e(3) (b).
74. For the history of the general articles see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
745-46 (1974).
75. Id. at 746-47. See cases cited at note 56 supra. For a judicial history of the
general articles, see Wiener, supra note 56.
76. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (MCM) 11 212-213 & 127c. An executive
promulgation, the MCM contains a table of maximum punishments for various
violations and describes the court-martial procedure. Detailed commentary at-
tempts to narrow the purview of the punitive articles by setting forth specific
applications for each provision. See generally Ackroyd, Professor Morgan and
the Drafting of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 28 MIL. L. REv. 14 (1965).
77. Perhaps because of the articles' generality, the military makes a concerted
effort to advise its personnel of the contents of the UCMJ, first on enlistment and
then after six months of active service. UCMJ, art. 137, 10 U.S.C. § 937 (1970).
Moreover, the military's enforcement of the general articles arguably has been
reasonable. One critic who reviewed thousands of cases under Article 134 and
its predecessors found no situation in which the accused could not reasonably
have understood that his action was proscribed by the statute. Gaynor, Prejudicial
and Discreditable Military Conduct: A Critical Appraisal of the General Articles,
22 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 288-89 (1971).
78. See notes 60-64 supra & accompanying text.
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disputed in Culver never has been limited by judicial construction.7 9
Moreover, the effect of its enforcement is to restrict political demon-
strations, a form of speech and conduct traditionally protected by the
first amendment.
Clearly, the vagueness standard enunciated in Parker was inappli-
cable in Culver absent an extended legal analysis. The Supreme Court
in Parker has specified the test to be applied in reviewing the con-
stitutionality of the UCMJ articles, provisions that were enacted by
Congress.80 Whether the Court intended that the same standard be ap-
plied in the review of military regulations promulgated by the execu-
tive branch, however, is uncertain.
That the need for a separate standard was based on "the factors
differentiating military society from civilian society" 81 suggests that
the test in Parker should apply to reviews of military regulations. Al-
though the Supreme Court's view of the military as a "society
apart" 82 arguably is unwarranted in many respects, 3 crucial differ-
ences between military and civilian society justify stricter regulation
79. The Court of Military Appeals decided a case involving a regulation
similar to that challenged in Culver two years after Captain Culver's court-
martial. United States v. Alexander, 22 C.M.A. 485, 47 C.M.R. 786 (1973). The
court in Alexander avoided the constitutional issues by refusing to apply the
regulation to on-base expressions against military policy. Id. at 487-88, 47 C.M.R.
at 788-89. In contrast to Culver, in which the challenged regulation banned all
demonstrations, the regulation in Alexander permitted such activity if the ser-
viceman obtained permission from his commanding officer. Army Reg. 600-20,
Jan. 31, 1967, reprinted in United States v. Alexander, 22 C.M.A. at 486, 47
C.M.R. at 787.
80. See 471 U.S. at 756.
81. Id. The Court consistently has recognized that inherent differences be-
tween civilian and military society create a "vast gulf between civilian and
military jurisdiction." Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338, 357 (1946). Thus,
the Court has stated:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army .... The
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in
judicial matters.
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
The principal factor distinguishing military society from its civilian counter-
part is the fundamental necessity for obedience and discipline among members of
the armed forces. As a result, the prevailing military law is "that of obedience,"
In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890), withoutl which the military would be
unable "to perform its mission effectively." 417 U.S. at 744.
82. Id.
83. For a discussion of the major changes in military discipline within the last
twenty years, see Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Con-
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of servicemen's conduct. For example, the maintenance of esprit de
corps and discipline in combat, major concerns of the military com-
mander, constitute areas incapable of reduction to precise rules; in
drafting regulations to implement such objectives, the military re-
quires a latitude that would be impermissible in civilian society. More-
over, orders and regulations governing the daily operations of the
military affect discipline and obedience more directly than do the
general articles of the UCMJ. Such justifications for many types of
restrictions of conduct 8 4 suggest that the Parker standards properly
are applicable to the regulation challenged in Culver.
Because the term "demonstration" was defined neither in the regu-
lation nor by judicial construction, Culver asserted that the blanket
ban on participation in demonstrations was insufficient to provide
him with adequate notice that his conduct was prohibited. 5 He argued
that the word "demonstration" as used in the regulation was analogous
to the imprecise language condemned by the Supreme Court in Smith
v. Goguen,8 6 Coates v. City of Cincinnati,8 7 and Lanzetta v. New
Jersey.88 Dismissing this argument peremptorily, the court stated that
as used in the regulation the term had acquired a "kind of gloss." 89
trolling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539 (1974). See generally Zillman & Imwinkel-
tied, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on a Society
Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396 (1976).
84. Without extended discussion, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had reached this conclusion in an earlier case, Carlson v. Schles-
inger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975). While stationed on a United States air-
base in Vietnam, Carlson was arrested for soliciting signatures on an anti-war
petition. Air Force regulations required that prior approval of petitioning
activity be obtained from the installation commander; the commander had denied
such approval on the basis of a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, and
morale of other servicemen on the base. Reversing the district court's finding that
the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, the court of appeals stated that
the regulation was based upon military necessity and that the decision of the
installation commander would stand unless "manifestly unrelated to legitimate
military interests." Id. at 1333.
85. 559 F.2d at 623-24 n.5.
86. 415 U.S. 566 (1972) ("treats contemptuously the flag of the United States"
held vague).
87. 402 U.S. 611 (1971) ("conduct . . . annoying to persons passing by" held
vague).
88. 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ("gang" held vague).
89. 559 F.2d at 628. The "gloss" derived both from common parlance and
from usage in the regulation itself, "from the context of 'protest and dissent' in
which it appears." Id.
Chief Judge Bazelon's dissenting opinion agreed that the term had acquired
a gloss but contended that the resultant meaning of the word "blurs into vague-
ness precisely in the area of appellant's activity. I assume that 'demonstration'
would not describe individual presentations of petitions . .. just as I assume
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Therefore, no valid comparison could be made between the word
"demonstration" and the terms held impermissibly vague in the
earlier cases.90
The court's summary holding that Goguen and Coates were inap-
plicable is correct: the statutory language contested in those earlier
cases required a subjective determination of the propriety of the pro-
scribed conduct, whereas the word "demonstration," as used in the
regulation, carried reasonably objective connotations. A distinction be-
tween Culver and Lanzett, however, is not as obvious. Both cases
questioned whether a given term was defined adequately in its criminal
context. The court in Culver reasoned that Lanzett was inapposite
because the word "gang," as used in the challenged statutes in Lan-
zetta, frequently appeared in other, noncriminal contexts.9 ' The argu-
ment is unconvincing, however, because "demonstration" also has
meaning outside the context of a political protest.
The court's distinction is strained and ultimately unnecessary inas-
much as the facts of Culver comprised a situation in which Parker's
relaxed standard of review was directly applicable. In discussing this
standard of vagueness with respect to economic regulations, the
Supreme Court has stated that compliance with due process does not
require "impossible standards of specificity" 92 and that the suffi-
ciency of notice provided by a statute necessarily must be examined
"in light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged." 93 Some
imprecision in defining the word "demonstration," therefore, would
not invalidate the regulation in question if the nature of Culver's
activity fell within that class of actions undoubtedly encompassed by
the term.94
As planned and executed, the group activity in Culver constituted a
demonstration. Prior to the rally, Culver had distributed pamphlets
soliciting servicemen stationed in England to participate in what was
labelled a "presentation" of antiwar petitions to the Ambassador at
the American Embassy in London.95 The literature noted that partici-
pants would be bussed into London from their bases and that "[o]nly
that it would describe mass gatherings with all the usual trappings of political
protests. Appellant's activity fell somewhere between these extremes." 559 F.2d
at 633-34 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
90. 559 F.2d at 628.
91. Id. at 628 n.10.
92. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
93. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33 (1963). See
text accompanying note 61 supra.
94. Under this standard, Chief Judge Bazelon's argument is without merit. See
notes 89-93 supra & accompanying text.
95. Culver claimed that, rather than demonstrating, he was exercising his
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when a large number of G.I.'s turn out can we have an effect." 96
Moreover, at the request of British police the organizers had changed
both the location of the assembly and the manner of the presentation
to prevent crowds from congregating at the Embassy. Thus, from
its inception the "presentation" was intended to involve a large group
of servicemen. 97
Culver's intention remained unchanged notwithstanding his receipt
of a statement prepared by the local Staff Judge Advocate, noting
that participation in a demonstration was punishable regardless of its
appellation.9 8 The communication's timing alone implied strongly that
it was directed at Culver's planned activity and that his superiors con-
sidered the assembly to be a prohibited demonstration. 9 Nevertheless,
the event proceeded as planned, attracting 200 servicemen and invok-
ing comments to the press by group leaders.1°°
Despite the regulation's failure to define the term "demonstration"
specifically, Culver's activity clearly fell within the class of actions
that a reasonable person would designate a demonstration.'0 ' Ap-
plying the Parker rationale, then, the court correctly rejected Culver's
vagueness challenge.
constitutional right to present a petition at the American Embassy. However, the
demonstration was accorded no special status merely because it involved the
presentation of petitions. See 559 F.2d at 632-33. (Leventhal, J., concurring).
Because the military did not prohibit individual servicemen from inconspicuously
delivering petitions to the Embassy, the Air Force regulation did not infringe
upon the right to petition.
96. 559 F.2d at 625 (quoting the text of the leaflet distributed by Culver).
97. Id. at 627.
98. Id. at 626. The statement noted that the prohibitions of Air Force Reg.
35-15, 1 3e(3) (b) applied "whether the serviceman or servicewoman is on or off
base, in or out of uniform, on or off duty." Id.
99. The binding effect of such notice depended on whether the Staff Judge
Advocate's interpretation of AFR 35-15 3e(3) (b) carried the force of law. As
noted in Chief Judge Bazelon's dissenting opinion, however, this question was
not raised at trial. 559 F.2d 635 n.3.
100. Although wearing civilian clothes, the military members who participated
in the assembly, including Culver, also wore white arm bands depicting a helmet
and upraised clenched fist. 559 F.2d at 626-27.
101. On the issue of whether Culver had notice that he was participating in a
prohibited demonstration, the district court stated:
[A]t the time of the commission of the offense, plaintiff was not
an untutored novice. He had been on active duty as a judge advocate
for more than five years, and had extensive expertise in the area of
military criminal law. He ... cannot claim ignorance or naivete.
Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force, 389 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd,




Culver's adoption of Parker's standard for reviewing challenges of
overbreadth followed implicitly. After determining that the factual
situation in Culver constituted a demonstration within the meaning
of the regulation, 0 2 the court concluded that the military constitu-
tionally could forbid servicemen abroad from participating in a wide
range of political activity. 0 3 Indirectly, therefore, the circuit court
held that the Air Force regulation was not overbroad and could validly
prohibit Culver's activity. 0 4
Parker's overbreadth analysis is not directly relevant in Culver in-
asmuch as the Supreme Court, in the former case, stated that the
petitioner's conduct "was unprotected under the most expansive no-
tions of the First Amendment." 105 Yet, the activity challenged in
Culver involved political conduct that traditionally has been protected
by the Constitution. Notably, however, the Court in Parker recognized
that "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible out-
side it." 106 Moreover, the Court relied upon this rationale in the sub-
sequent case of Greer v. Spok,107 which upheld a ban against civilian
political activities within the confines of a domestic military base. 08
As a result, Greer and Parker, in combination, support the proposition
that the military may forbid some conduct traditionally protected by
the first amendment if such a prohibition is necessary for the mainte-
nance of discipline and obedience within the armed forces. Whether
the military may proscribe these activities for a purpose other than the
protection of internal order is uncertain. Even if the armed forces pro-
hibit conduct that would be permissible in the civilian community, the
test for constitutionality approved in Parker requires that the breadth
of the proscription be closely related to the needs of the military. 0 9
102. 559 F.2d at 627.
103. Id. at 628.
104. The court rejected Culver's overbreadth claim with sweeping language.
Id. at 628, 630. Because Parker establishes that a serviceman normally would not
be given expanded standing to contest the constitutionality of a military regula-
tion, 417 U.S. at 760, however, the court's holding in Culver must be regarded as
dictum to the extent that it might be applicable to factual situations differing
from the circumstances in the case.
105. 417 U.S. at 761.
106. Id. at 758.
107. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
108. Id. at 839.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 23 C.M.A. 542, 50 C.M.R. 713 (1975)
(naval regulation prohibiting usury held unduly restrictive); United States v.
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Thus, in declaring invalid a Navy regulation for overbreadth, the
Court of Military Appeals asserted that "an order which is broadly
restrictive of a private right is arbitrary and illegal in the absence of
circumstances demonstrating a connection to a military need." 110
In Culver, however, the court failed to establish any relationship
between the regulation's broad ban against off-base political activity
by Air Force personnel stationed abroad and the need to maintain
internal standards of obedience and discipline. Indeed, in view of
previous Supreme Court decisions, the establishment of such a con-
nection may be impossible. In Greer, for example, the Court upheld
Army regulations prohibiting on-base speeches and requiring activists
to obtain prior approval of headquarters command before distributing
political literature on base "I but also stated that "Eu]nder such a
policy, members of the Armed Forces . . . are wholly free as indi-
viduals to attend political rallies, out of uniform and off base." 112 The
Court in Greer recognized that the armed forces, regardless of their
interest in maintaining internal order, cannot constitutionally prohibit
all political activity by servicemen, implying that the off-base conduct
of military personnel may not be considered a threat to discipline and
obedience. Moreover, in view of Supreme Court holdings that Ameri-
can citizens in a foreign country enjoy the same constitutional protec-
tion with respect to acts by federal officials as do those at home,-1 3
this explanation of Greer applies to Culver although the conduct in
the latter case occurred in England. Clearly, the Air Force regulation
in Culver cannot be justified under the holding in Parker as a restric-
tion upon the conduct of servicemen that is designed to maintain
internal order within that branch of the armed services.
Ultimately, the court in Culver upheld the regulation for foreign
policy reasons. Rather than promoting discipline, the prohibition of
Milldebrandt, 8 C.M.A. 635, 25 C.M.R. 139 (1958) (order to report financial condi-
tion at specified times held unrelated to the requirements of military service and
unduly broad); United States v. Martin, 1 C.M.A. 674, 5 C.M.R. 102 (1952)
(military need justified order prohibiting transfer of cigarettes for bartering
purposes).
110. United States v. Smith, 23 C.M.A. 542, 544, 50 C.M.R. 713, 715 (1975).
111. 424 U.S. at 839-40.
112. Id. at 839.
113. Although the Court held in 1891 that "[t]he Constitution can have no
operation in a foreign country," In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891), subsequent
decisions consistently have held otherwise. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957),
for example, the Court stated that "[wihen the Government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts
of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in another land." Id. at 6. See generally L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
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demonstrations by military personnel avoids embarrassment and fric-
tion between the United States and foreign countries in which Ameri-
can armed forces are based.114 As all the judges in Culver agreed,115
the military occupies a particularly sensitive position in foreign af-
fairs. Host countries, perceiving the presence of foreign military
forces as a threat to their national sovereignty, might demand as a
prerequisite to the stationing of foreign forces on their soil that the
sending nation strictly control its military personnel. The court
emphasized that the NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement "6 placed the
United States under an important treaty obligation to ensure the poli-
tical inactivity of American servicemen stationed in England.1.7
Culver therefore suggests that the foreign policy goal of military
unobtrusiveness in host nations validly may require restrictions on
servicemen's conduct similar to those that may be imposed to main-
tain military discipline and obedience. Such a conclusion is reasonable.
A well-disciplined army would be useless if it could not be deployed
in a militarily strategic area of the world. Officers of the armed
forces must have the authority to promulgate and enforce such regula-
tions as are necessary to ensure compliance with the conditions under
which a host nation has consented to the stationing of United States
forces on its soil.
The judges in Culver do not disagree with this proposition; their
opinions differ, however, as to its application. Chief Judge Bazelon
would prohibit a total ban on political demonstrations by military per-
sonnel; instead, a serviceman might participate in organized activities
if he first secured his commanding officer's approval."18 Moreover, the
judge would invalidate the proscription of any activity that was not
actually proved to be harmful to the relationship between the United
States and the host nation." 9
Supporting the court's opinion upholding the regulation, Judge
Leventhal successfully rebuts the Chief Judge's proposals. Leventhal
notes that "[i] ndividual servicemen cannot demand the right to pre-
dict or determine which demonstrations will prove disruptive or em-
114. 559 F.2d at 628.
115. Id.; id. at 631-32 (Leventhal, J., concurring) ; id. at 635-36 (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
116. The NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement, [1951] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S.
No. 2486, art. II provides: "It is the duty of a force ... and the members thereof
... to abstain . . . in particular, from any political activity in the receiving
state. It is also the duty of the sending state to take necessary measures to that
end." [1951] 4 U.S.T. at 1796.
117. 559 F.2d at 628.
118. Id. at 638-39 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 639.
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barrassing in our relations with the host country." 120 This statement
is applicable whether the serviceman is the commanding officer of a
military base or the person planning to participate in an off-base
demonstration. Obviously, neither individual should be allowed to act
on his own speculations as to the probable effects of a demonstration:
such a determination involves the consideration and formulation of
complex foreign policy issues. With respect to Chief Judge Bazelon's
suggestion requiring proof of the harmful effects of any particular
demonstration, Leventhal observes that England already has articu-
lated, in the Status-of-Forces Agreement, its objection to such activity
and that no further testimony, which in itself might prove to be em-
barrassing to the host nation, should be necessary.121
Because military regulations designed to implement foreign policy
considerations probably will prohibit conduct that traditionally has
been protected by the Constitution, they should be subjected to a mili-
tary necessity test similar to that approved in Parker.22 Under this
test, a military regulation banning political demonstrations in a
foreign country would not be valid unless, as in Culver, the host nation
had specificially demanded as a condition to the stationing of armed
forces within its borders that the United States restrict the organized
activities of its servicemen. Moreover, a court should construe any
such condition narrowly to prohibit only the conduct with which the
host country was concerned. Finally, regulations and orders imple-
menting a ban on political demonstrations can be issued validly only
from those groups within the military who are competent to interpret
and formulate issues of foreign policy. Thus, for the same reason that
a commanding officer is unable to authorize participation in off-base
demonstrations by individual military personnel, he also is incapable
of unilaterally promulgating an order banning such activity. 23
CONCLUSION
Culver v. Secretary of the Air Force represents a significant ex-
tension of the power of the military to restrict the individual freedoms
of its servicemen. Previously, such restrictions could be justified only
120. Id. at 632 (Leventhal. J., concurring).
121. Id. at 632 n.3.
122. 417 U.S. at 758-59. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
123. Apart from these procedural limitations on the imposition of restrictions
on servicemen's rights, the armed forces' ability to agree to these proscriptions
may be circumscribed in some instances by overriding constitutional considera-
tions. A delineation of the ultimate controls that the military constitutionally
may exercise over its personnel is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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by the intrinsic need for a high level of obedience and discipline within
the military. In Culver, however, the external pressures created by
the military's position in foreign affairs were deemed sufficiently
sensitive to permit the enforcement of restrictions on the first amend-
ment freedoms of servicemen. The importance of such rights to
civilians and military personnel alike mandates a narrow reading of
Culver's holding under a test of strict military necessity.
